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In 2006, the Thunderbird tribunal, operating under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, called for 
the harmonization of cost-allocation approaches in commercial and investment arbitration.1 
Subsequent tribunals appear to be heeding Thunderbird’s call paving a trend in favor of the so-
called “costs follow the event” (CFtE) approach and its variations.2 Generally, this approach 
prescribes the shifting of arbitral costs and reasonable legal fees to the unsuccessful party (or 
based on parties’ relative success) and has historically been prevalent in commercial arbitration. 
By contrast, the more traditional approach in investment arbitration has been to share the costs of 
arbitration equally, save for special circumstances, with each party covering its own legal fees 
(traditional approach).3 In the wake of what appears to be an emerging trend in favor of a default 
CFtE custom, it is time to revisit the idea of whether a single harmonized approach to cost 
allocation is really appropriate. We suggest that it most likely is not. 
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The two above-referenced rules of cost allocation serve different purposes, having divergent 
implications for the parties. From the claimants’ perspective, taking into account absolute cost of 
arbitration, CFtE is largely a deterrent, while the traditional approach encourages arbitration.4 
Simply put, a claimant is less likely to initiate an arbitration when it risks paying not only its own 
expenses, but also those of its opponent.5 CFtE makes arbitration less appealing to claimants 
(and would-be third-party funders), more risky and/or outright economically unviable, if a 
claim’s value is lower than the absolute cost of arbitration. Under the traditional approach, on the 
other hand, the absolute cost is likely to be significantly lower and, above all, more certain, as 
each party is responsible for its own portion of the costs.6 As a result, by encouraging the parties 
to try for their day in court, the rule leads to a more dynamic development of arbitral 
jurisprudence and broader access to justice. 
 
These, and potentially other, implications might not necessarily resonate with the goals of a 
particular arbitral forum. In the context of ICSID, particularly, the CFtE approach is less likely to 
meet that forum’s goals. As a dispute-resolution center, ICSID is unique, as it sets an agenda 
“attaching particular importance” to the “availability” of the arbitration facility to the parties.7 
No set of commercial arbitration rules explicitly affirms such goals. The negotiating history of 
the Convention also demonstrates that the parties voiced the concerns the traditional approach 
seeks to eliminate.8 On the contrary, the arbitration rules of many commercial arbitral institutions 
promote an arbitration mechanism impartial to the general availability of the forum to any party.9 
 
Therefore, where the traditional approach as a baseline might meet the priorities of the forum, 
CFtE might fail them entirely, and vice versa. Consequently, the default customs of cost 
allocation based not on the relative success but on matching the policy goals of a forum and the 
effects of the customs might be a better lodestar for arbitral discretion. Once ascertained, the 
tribunals should consistently apply the default custom instilling confidence in the arbitration 
system. Of course, in certain instances costs should be shifted regardless of the default rule due 
to such factors as party conduct during the arbitration, the egregiousness of the respondent’s 
actions, or the fraudulent/frivolous nature of the claims. But, a default CFtE custom in the 
context of ICSID seems inapposite just at a time when it appears to be gaining popularity. 
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For further information, including information regarding submitting to the Perspectives, please contact: Vale 
Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment, Shawn Lim, shawnlwk@gmail.com. 
The Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment (VCC), led by Lisa Sachs, is a joint center of 
Columbia Law School and the Earth Institute at Columbia University. It is the only applied research center and 
forum dedicated to the study, practice and discussion of sustainable international investment, through 
interdisciplinary research, advisory projects, multi-stakeholder dialogue, educational programs, and the development 
of resources and tools. 
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